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Abstract 
This article provides an introduction to some theoretical ideas and practices from the so-
called “philosophers of difference” – Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari. They 
afford an opportunity to think differently about the construction of learning disability and 
to envision new forms of learning. Two key concepts – Foucault‟s transgression and 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s rhizome – are introduced and examples from research on 
learning disability and other dimensions of disability are given to illustrate their potential. 
The theoretical practices of deconstruction, developed by Derrida, and Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s rhizomatic analysis are also presented and exemplified. I argue that these 
these theoretical concepts and practices, if taken up, shift the researcher towards an 
ethics of research and to greater responsibility. The implications of this are discussed in 
the final part of the paper. 
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Introduction 
This paper proposes some new forms of engagement with theory in research on 
learning disability. These provide the prospect of “thinking otherwise” (Ball, 1994, p. 23) 
and enabling us as academics to meet our responsibilities towards students identified as 
having learning disabilities more effectively.In advocating a more extensive engagement 
with theory, I am suggesting some particular associations, most notably with a group of 
French philosophers known as the philosophers of difference. Deleuze and Guattari, 
Derrida and Foucault have been portrayed as philosophers of difference because of 
their concern with achieving recognition of minority social groups and because they all, 
in differing ways, attempt to formulate a politics of difference based on an acceptance of 
multiplicity (Patton, 2000). Each of these writers have in common an orientation to 
philosophy as a political act and a will to make use of philosophical concepts as a form, 
not of global revolutionary change, but of “active experimentation, since we do not know 
in advance which way a line is going to turn” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 137). Their 
work is a philosophy of affirmation, which is a “belief of the future, in the future” 
(Deleuze, quoted in Rajchman, 2001, p. 76). It does not offer solutions, but rather 
produces new concepts, “provocation” (Bains, 2002), and new imaginings, “knocking 
down partitions, co-extensive with the world” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 22).  
 
The ideas of the philosophers of difference are made to work in a practical sense in two 
ways. First, the ideas themselves are taken and are used to provoke a different kind of 
sense-making within the field of learning disability. It is not, however, a simple task to 
see, think and act differently; it is necessary, therefore to also use some of the theory 
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practices of the philosophers of difference to help achieve a new orientation to research 
methodology (Allan, 2008). A brief „taste‟ of two key ideas of the philosophers of 
difference – transgression and the rhizome - is provided below, together with some 
examples of how these have been used to reflect upon current ways of thinking about 
and discussing people with learning disabilities and to “relocate them in new words and 
worlds” (Granger, 2010). Two major theory practices which could be taken up in 
research within learning disability – deconstruction and rhizomic analysis – are also 
outlined and exemplified.  The examples are drawn from the US, the UK and Australia 
and relate to learning disability and other dimensions of disability. In the UK and 
Australia, learning disability (or intellectual disability) has a different provenance and 
politics from that in the US (Sleeter, 1987) and is deployed across a greater proportion 
of student population. It is hoped that in spite of these differences, the examples will 
illustrate the powerful capacity of these philosophical theories to inspire new thought. 
The utilisation of these concepts and practices take the researcher into a new kind of 
engagement within the field of learning disability which can best be described, drawing 
again on the philosophers of difference and on Levinas (1969), as an ethics. The 
implications of an ethical engagement in learning disability research are discussed in the 
final part of the paper.  
 
Transgression 
Many researchers are familiar with, and have even used, Foucault‟s concepts of power 
and knowledge to explore, often to very good effect, the way in which individuals with 
learning disabilities and other kinds of special needs are controlled and constrained 
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within schooling contexts (Allan, 1999; Reid & Valle, 2004; Tremain, 2005).  Whilst such 
analyses provide important insights, they offer little hope that individuals can escape 
such constraints. Foucault‟s still relatively unexplored later works on ethics enables the 
examination of how disabled people can and do challenge their constraints and his 
notion of transgression is particularly helpful in this regard. Transgression, the practical 
and playful resistance to limits (Foucault, 1994), is an important way for disabled people 
to challenge the disabling barriers they encounter. Transgression is not antagonistic or 
aggressive, nor does it involve a contest in which there is a victor; rather, it allows 
disabled individuals to shape their own identities by subverting the norms which compel 
them to repeatedly perform as marginal.  For those who transgress, according to Boyne 
(1990), “otherness lies ahead” (p. 82) and they are not required to – and indeed could 
not – reject these identities entirely, but can vary the way in which they have to repeat 
these performances. 
 
Evidence of transgression by disabled students emerged in my own work (Allan, 1999) 
as something of a surprise. The research focused on experiences of students with 
special needs, and their mainstream peers, in regular schools, and, in line with 
Foucauldian genealogies of power and knowledge, I had expected to find students who 
were constrained and controlled by the discourses and practices of special education. 
This indeed was the case and the hierarchies of surveillance through the assessment 
procedures and teaching practices had significant disciplinary effects on the young 
people and their families. However, the disabled students also transgressed these 
effects in particularly subtle and effective ways. Raschida, a visually impaired student, 
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first alerted me to the extent and scope of transgression, beaming as she described how 
the long cane which she hated, because it was so visible, had been „dropped‟ in a lake. 
The loss of the long cane, she reported gleefully, had annoyed her teachers, but had 
enabled her to escape the imperative to perform her visual impairment in public. She 
had subsequently acquired a smaller folding cane which was much less obvious and 
with which she was more comfortable. Raschida also described an episode of 
transgression in which she pretended to be „blind drunk,‟ rather than blind, when she 
was with her boyfriend: 
 
I usually met him at nights and that and he was [drunk] … I used to always pretend 
that I was drunk as well. I [wasn‟t] really, but I was just saying that he‟d think, if I 
couldn‟t see anything, he‟d realize [laughs] … I decided to tell him. Because we 
used to meet up at my friend‟s house and I knew her house quite well as well, so I 
never used to bang into things or anything, I‟d just act normal, casual (Allan, 1999, 
p. 106). 
 
Transgressive strategies surfaced among students with a „learning disabled‟ or „learning 
difficulties‟ label, although, as has already been made clear these descriptive categories, 
having emerged in the UK through routes of mental retardation and mental handicap, 
have had less of the political and ideological significance than learning disability has had 
in the United States. One student, Brian, who had Down‟s syndrome, orchestrated a 
subtle shift in the extent of the presence of his learning disability depending on which of 
his special needs assistant was on duty. He appeared to exhibit a more significant 
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degree of learning disability and dependency with his afternoon – somewhat mothering 
– assistant which contrasted with his morning experiences when the assistant who took 
a more disciplinarian approach was present.  Dudley-Marling (2004), in his research, 
illustrates how powerfully the teachers‟  positioning of students and whether they identify 
them positively or in relation to their deficits can have on their responses and Brian‟s 
reaction demonstrates this as well as highlighting the capacity of students to transgress. 
Brian also transgressed in his relationships with other students, appearing to cross the 
line of normal boundaries of touch with one student in particular. What was striking was 
the mainstream students‟ capacities to recognise and tolerate such transgression but to 
also seek to turn such encounters into pedagogic instances where they were able to 
support Brian‟s inclusion.  
 
Researchers have uncovered instances of students transgressing in ways which made 
them seem more disabled. Ferri and Connor (2009) demonstrated the powerful capacity 
of young working class women of colour to transgress into learning disability through a 
recognition of the perceived advantages it offered. They also uncovered a variety of 
sophisticated strategies by the young women to evade the unwanted attention of peers 
and found that “passing, rather than signalling an internalisation of stigma or self-hatred, 
serves as a tactic for negotiating what is perceived as an invasion of privacy and for 
refusing ableist assumptions” (Ferri & Connor, 2009, p. 109).  In my own research 
reported above, Peter, who had behavioural difficulties, regularly referred to himself as 
“a spastic” (Allan, 1999, p. 54) and described how he would “sometimes say things to 
shock people” (Allan, 1999, p. 54). As with Brian, Peter‟s fellow students demonstrated 
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their ability and willingness to make some space for such transgressive acts and to try to 
support his inclusion.  
 
Granger (2010) describes how she transgressed her learning disabled identity, as it had 
been formed for her by her teachers, and which characterised failure on her part. Her 
initial self loathing at what she had been told she could not do was replaced by a 
recognition of the uses of social power that had produced that hate. She acquired a 
“ghostly presence” that “threatened to disrupt” and took great satisfaction in whispering 
to her fellow students that it was not necessary to conform: “this shit doesn‟t matter”. 
Granger‟s account is a powerful call to “transform silence about our denigration, to 
outrage about this denigration and a celebration of who we are”.   
 
These acts of transgression enabled individuals to challenge the limits placed upon 
them and exercise control over themselves and others. They were also largely positive 
acts, which challenge the idea that passing or evading an identification as disabled is 
shameful. The transgressions were, however, temporary and partial, had to be 
constantly repeated and reactions to them had to be monitored. Transgression appears 
to have value as a concept in helping to understand ways in which learning disabled 
individuals may challenge and resist practices within school. It allows us to find a way of 
reading these, not as further evidence of pathology, but as positive expression and as 
desire.  
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The rhizome 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) offer the rhizome as a model of thought, which challenges 
both conventional knowledge and the means of acquiring this knowledge. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, conventional knowledge is rigid, striated and hierarchical and has 
an “arborescent” or tree like structure. Learning within such a structure involves the 
transfer of knowledge through a process of representation, “which articulates and 
hierarchizes tracings” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 12) and emphasises facts and 
students are required to display their learning merely through repetition of these facts, 
with little opportunity for variation. Knowledge of this kind relies on the logic of binarism 
for example normal/abnormal or able/disabled, and places these hierarchically within the 
system, identifying those on the negative side of the binary as targets for remediation 
and control. This kind of learning is inadequate because it is partial, with meaning being 
lost through continual fracturing. Students‟ involvement in these learning processes is 
also partial, contingent, and tied to individuals‟ pathologies, which in turn fragment and 
locate students within the striations of the school system.  
 
In place of the arborescent tree structure of knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari propose 
the notion of a rhizome, which grows or moves in messy and unpredictable ways. Their 
examples of rhizomes include bulbs or tubers, but also rats and burrows: “the best and 
the worst” (1987, p. 7).  Rhizomes have multiple connections, lines and points of 
rupture, but no foundation or essence, and the connectivity of these lines make a 
rejection of binarism inevitable:  
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That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary 
form of the good and the bad. You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet 
there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify 
everything, formations that restore power to a signifier, attributions that reconstitute 
a subject – anything you like, from Oedipal resurgences to fascist concretions 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 9). 
 
The rhizome as a model of learning “releases us from the false bondage of linear 
relationships” (Roy, 2003, p. 90) and allows for endless proliferation, new lines of flight 
and new forms of knowledge:  
 
Expression must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings. When a 
form is broken, one must reconstruct the content that will necessarily be part of a 
rupture in the order of things (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 28). 
 
Each rhizome contains: 
 
lines of segmentation according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, 
signified, attributed, etc.; but also lines of deterritorialization along which it 
endlessly flees (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 18). 
 
These “ruptures and new sproutings” present new challenges and new ways of 
experiencing learning. They are not, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) caution, secure 
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spaces where individuals can be passive but a series of lines in which they must 
participate: A rhizome, a burrow, yes – but not an ivory tower. A line of escape, yes – 
but not a refuge (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 41). Rhizomic learning is always in 
process, having to be constantly worked at by all concerned and never complete. This 
in-betweenness is an inclusive space in which everyone belongs and where movement 
occurs. Whilst the rhizome has obvious metaphorical appeal, establishing it as the 
model for thinking about learning is much more complex: 
 
It is not a matter of exposing the Root and announcing the Rhizome. There are 
knots of arborescence in rhizomes and rhizomatic offshoots in roots. The rhizome 
is perpetually in construction or collapsing, a process that is perpetually prolonging 
itself, breaking off and starting up again (Gregoriou, 2004, p. 244).  
 
The concept of the rhizome appeared useful in understanding the learning and 
experiences of group of children in a school in which the headteacher had introduced 
children‟s rights (Allan et al, 2006). A small group of children was formed to look at 
inclusion in the school and the group, which called itself the Special Needs Observation 
Group (SNOG), was initially established by a parent of two disabled children in the 
school, but the children gradually assumed responsibility for their own activities. The 
group experienced a form of rhizomic learning in which they experimented with, and 
experienced, inclusion. They took rights - literally - on a walk through the school in order 
to discover the points at which exclusion arose. Simulation exercises of this kind, in 
which non-disabled individuals pretend to be disabled, can be superficial and 
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essentialist, but these young people directed their gaze to the disabling barriers and 
found themselves able to imagine the exclusion experienced by their disabled peers. 
This kind of learning about rights seemed to be particularly effective because it took 
them off in new and unanticipated directions. Having dealt with disability, the group 
decided to move onto ethnicity, and identified some concerns about the level of 
participation of some individuals. They then decided to tackle weight issues when they 
became aware of some of their peers‟ discomfort when changing for gym. Their 
experience and experimentation with rights had alerted them to new forms of exclusion 
that they wished to do something about.  
 
For one young person, Alistair, the experience of being part of the SNOG group, and of 
rhizomic learning, was particularly significant in rescuing him from a downward spiral of 
misbehaviour and exclusion. He described himself as having been out of control, often 
getting into trouble in the playground for fighting and being regularly excluded. Prior to 
joining SNOG, he had become a buddy to a disabled child and being responsible for 
someone else had made him alter his own behaviour. His membership of SNOG had, by 
his own account, transformed him into someone else, someone who had to have regard 
for others, and had allowed him to escape the deviant identity that was being ascribed to 
him. It was a dramatic line of flight:  
 
Well, when I started to know [disabled students] I was, like, I need to show them 
I want to be good, „cos I used to get into fights and stupid things like that but 
when I started to get to know them and got into the SNOG group I started my 
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behaviour; I wanted to start again and be good … I didn‟t want everybody to 
know me as Alistair the bad boy. I want to be good now. So that‟s what I was 
trying to do when I went into the SNOG group … sometimes I‟m amazing (Allan 
& I‟Anson, 2005, p. 133).  
 
Alistair had transformed himself, but recognised that he had to police his own newly 
formed identity and occasionally he lapsed:  
 
I get into a fight or I get angry because it didn‟t happen. If I didn‟t get to sit beside 
my friends I start to get angry. I just want to be a good boy now. As everybody 
says “good boy.” That‟s what I want to be – I want to prove them all wrong. They 
all think I [can‟t] behave but I want to prove them all wrong that I can behave … 
some people just know me as “there‟s Alistair – stay away from him.” But I‟m to 
prove them all wrong – that I‟m good. I‟m going to be good. I just want to be good 
now (Allan & I‟Anson, 2005, p. 134).  
Clearly such opportunities for escape would not be available to, or taken up, by every 
student with a label of behavioural difficulties. It is, nevertheless, a heartening 
transformation that delighted all those with whom Alistair was connected – the 
headteacher, the teachers, the janitor, Alistair‟s mother, and the researchers. Most 
impressed of all was Alistair himself who came to know himself as “amazing”.   
 
The concept of the rhizome has been used effectively by researchers to rethink disability 
in a more constructive way. Hickey-Moody (2008), working with learning disabled 
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dancers in Australia (where learning disability has a more generic application than in the 
US), has deployed the rhizome to reposition the body as becoming through movement - 
where they are in a state of continuous evolution - while Goodley and Moore (2002) 
have explored the potential of the arts‟ rhizomic qualities and its absence of constraints 
associated with language to open up possibilites for individuals with learning disabilities. 
Granger‟s (2010) reframing of her learning disabled self as trangressive and disruptive 
was arrived at through a recognition, although not articulated as such, that her learning 
was rhizomic.  She described reading “in the shape of a spiral” and her understanding 
taking the form of webs, puzzles and Rubik‟s Cubes that had to be constantly tended. 
Her recognition of her learning as having these features allowed her to enjoy her reading 
and understanding as “playfulness” rather than as “frustrated aggression” and to turn 
that playfulness into a game that she could play with others. Deleuze makes the point 
that children are already in the rhizome in their learning:  
 
Children never stop talking about what they are doing or trying to do: exploring 
milieus, by means of dynamic trajectories, and drawing up maps of them (Deleuze, 
1998, p. 61).  
 
This argument is also made by Olsson (2009) in her research with very young children 
and her work illustrates the positive effects of viewing learning as rhizomic which could 
be of great use in learning disability contexts. The value of the rhizome in learning 
disability is in its capacity to recognise forms of learning in their essence, rather than in 
relation to norms and expectations.  
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Deconstruction  
The function of deconstruction, as a theory practice, is to interrupt closure and certainty 
within texts and to create undecidability about their meaning and intent. Existing 
concepts such as justice, democracy, decision and responsibility are reinvented with a 
double meaning, relating to their absolute and unconditioned form and their contingent 
version into which the Other is allowed to come (Caputo, 1997; Patton, 2003). Texts are 
read with an eye to the way in which they “get into trouble, come unstuck, offer to 
contradict themselves” (Eagleton, 1993, p. 134). The process of deconstruction, for 
Derrida (1988), involves a double reading, a reading with at least two layers, usually by 
first repeating the “dominant interpretation” (p. 143) of a text, which takes the form of a 
commentary; and then opening up the text to its own blank spots, which lie behind, and 
are protected by, commentary. But these multiple readings have to be managed 
simultaneously, forcing the deconstructor to operate with “two texts, two hands, two 
visions, two ways of listening. Together at once and separately” (Derrida, 1982, p. 65).  
They involve reading both from the inside and the outside and Derrida (1976) depicts 
the deconstructor as a tight-rope walker who risks “ceaselessly falling back inside that 
which he deconstructs” (p. 14). It is a double reading that traverses the text and 
achieves “the destabilization of the stability of the dominant interpretation” (1988, p. 
147). Deconstruction seeks to locate a point of otherness and opens up a discourse on 
the Other which has been appropriated through logocentrism (Critchley, 1999). How one 
reads the text depends on the text itself and the less a text deconstructs itself, the more 
it can be deconstructed, opened up to itself, showing the flows of thought and 
assumptions which direct it and what it excludes. The deconstructive process has to 
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enter into the text‟s own trajectories and engage with them to find their moments of 
undecidability.  Such moments may be understood as what Derrida terms an “aporia” 
(1992, p. 22), a necessary ordeal of impossibility which one has to go through in order to 
make a decision and take responsibility: 
 
The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience 
and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from 
which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention 
(Derrida, 1992, p. 41; original emphasis).  
 
According to Derrida, the aporia, because it produces this ordeal of impossibility and 
forces a recognition of one”s obligation to the Other “conditions affirmation, decision and 
responsibility” (Derrida, 1992, p. 63).  
 
Deconstruction can help with the articulation of new political subjectivities, by privileging 
the voices of minorities and marginalised groups, including students with learning 
disabilities, and mobilizing politically around these. This is done by naming these 
groups, since, as Critchley reminds us, politics always requires naming a political 
subjectivity and organising around it. Ranciere (2008) usefully describes this process of 
naming making a discourse of that which has formerly been a noise and a process of 
rupture that renders certain identities visible: 
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For me a political subject is a subject who employs the competence of the so-
called incompetents or the part of those who have no part, and not an additional 
group to be recognised as part of society … It‟s a rupture that opens out into the 
recognition of the competence of anyone, not the addition of a unit (p. 3). 
 
Critchley (2007) cites examples of „indigenous‟ becoming a political force and achieving 
change in Mexico and Australia as a result of the process of claiming this name.  In 
Mexico, recognising that the name „peasant‟ no longer had any purchase, activists 
sought to enforce acceptance of a collective indigenous identity and Australian 
Aboriginals forcefully cemented the challenge to land rights through the establishment of 
a beach umbrella on the lawn facing the National Parliament which it named the 
“Aboriginal Tent Embassy” (p. 108). Critchley advocates a kind of demonstration as 
demos-tration, with demos referring to the people, on behalf of minorities, “manifesting 
the presence of those who do not count,” (p. 130) and this could be undertaken in 
research, writing and teaching with students with learning disabilities. The dangers of 
patronage or of spectacularising their difference are, however, strong and the 
declaration of the subjectivity of learning disabled whilst at the same time aspiring to 
deconstruct that very category is a double bind which it may not be possible to resolve.  
Artiles (2004) has argued that there is an urgent need to theorise the issue of 
representation in order to deepen our understanding of learning disability as a discursive 
practice. It is also necessary to theorise human subjectivity and while deconstruction 
helps to articulate and foreground subjectivity, a further step – towards ethics – is 
needed. I return to this in the final part of this paper.  
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Maclure (2005a) offers some extremely useful guidance on reading texts which amount 
to what she calls a deconstructive ethos. First of all, she recommends that researchers 
see the world, their data and themselves as text and that they think of such things as 
“the classroom”, “the child”, “the researcher” with invisible quotation marks round them. 
These constructs, she contends, are not natural, not self evident and never innocent. 
Second, she suggests looking for binary oppositions in texts, for example 
normal/abnormal and including the researcher‟s own biases and assumptions. Finally, 
she encourages researchers to challenge the taken-for-granted, not in a destructive 
spirit, nor in an effort to find the truth, but in order to open up textual spaces that seem 
closed and to confound things which seem simple but which are simplistic. 
 
A powerful deconstruction of learning disability is given by McDermott and Varenne 
(1995). Starting from their contention that a disability is a display board for the weakness 
of a cultural system than an indication of real people, they illustrate how three different 
ways of looking at culture and disability - a deprivation approach, a difference approach 
and a culture as disability approach - produced four different versions of Adam, a boy 
they observed in third and fourth grade. Their deconstruction shows how the various 
Adams are blamed, in different ways, for the failures of the systems. When they turn the 
focus of the same framework onto illiteracy, they are able to diagnose the nature of the 
systemic failings which lie in the testing processes themselves. McDermott and 
Varenne‟s deconstruction is a positive analysis and one which could generate solutions 
which could alter the outcomes for students with learning disabilities.  
Baker and Campbell (2006) offer an equally potent deconstruction of disability, law, 
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schooling and nations and demonstrate the way in which legal discourse, drawing on 
biomedical narratives, constructs the learning disabilities that then account for abnormal 
behaviour. They argue that such constructions produce, in Derrida‟s terms, aporias 
which create “openness and closure around leaky borders” (p. 341). Baker and 
Campbell suggest that rather than fix labels and diagnoses upon people, the openness 
and closure operate as “relations of intensification” (p. 341) and may provide new ways 
to think about the disabled body as in a constant state of “unfinishedness” (p. 342). So, 
by revealing the aporias as moments of undecidability, deconstruction enables us to see 
where there may be possibilities to think and practise differently.   
 
Examples of deconstruction in education generally include Lather‟s (2006) 
deconstruction of the scientificity within educational research and Maclure‟s (2005b) use 
of frivolity as a means of “discomposing the language of policy and thereby of unsettling 
its totalizing ambitions” (p. 1). My own deconstruction of disability policy within higher 
education (Allan, 2003) highlighted the ways in which exclusion became inscribed 
alongside declarations of inclusivity and access for disabled student teachers. The value 
of deconstruction for learning disability, in problematising our understanding and 
underlining our misunderstanding, is, as Derrida (1988) points out, “a stroke of luck … 
Otherwise, why speak, why discuss?” (p. 80).  
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Rhizomic analysis 
The metaphor of the rhizome can be deployed effectively in relation to the process of 
analysing research data, enabling what has previously been closed to surface and to 
effect: 
 
An unjamming effect in relation to the closed truths of the past, thereby freeing up 
the present for new forms of thought and practice (Bennett, 1990, p. 277). 
 
The use of the rhizome permits analysis to be concerned not with explaining or 
empirically demonstrating, but with exploring the various discursive formations which, 
following Foucault, seek to produce truths and create particular forms of subjectivity. 
Mozère (2002) described the kind of analysis offered by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) as 
a “style” (p. 4) of philosophy which engaged individuals‟ own ontologies:  
 
The novelty also of course was the way [Deleuze] used philosophy and how he 
encouraged people listening to him, not to conform but to experiment with new 
ways of being that would suit them (p. 4).  
 
Deleuze and Parnett (1987) emphasise the importance of rhizomic analysis doing 
something other than seeking to capture or pin down phenomena, since “movement 
always happens behind the thinker‟s back or in the movement when he blinks” (p. 1).  
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Rhizomic analysis differs significantly from that depicted within research textbooks 
aimed at doctoral and beginning researchers. These books, for example How to get a 
PhD (Phillips & Pugh, 1987) and Doing your research project (Bell, 1993), typically 
present the analysis process as linear, depicting research frameworks as arborescent 
and with a neat ordering of research themes. They promote the search for an orderly set 
of descriptive categories which leaves novice researchers ill-equipped for the series of 
“derailments” (Shostak, 2002, p. 5) and for the “logical graveyard where sense and 
nonsense fuse and meanings are loosened from their anchorage in master narratives” 
(p. 5) that they will inevitably experience during their own attempts at sense-making. 
Rhizomic analysis, in contrast, is non-linear, non-hierarchical and instead wanders, 
looking for things rather than themes. Data categories or thematic content become less 
interesting than routes and connections, breaks and fissures, and analyses become 
„maps‟ rather than „tracings‟ of knowledge.   
 
Whilst, as I have already suggested, several researchers have taken up the concept of 
the rhizome to help explore and explain learning disability and disability more generally, 
there are fewer instances of researchers undertaking rhizomic analyses. This is largely 
due to the unsettling nature of such analyses, but those who have gone down this route 
have been rewarded with some new understandings. Mercieca (2008) pursued rhizomic 
analysis in his doctoral study of profoundly disabled students in his own classroom and 
has subsequently argued that the rhizome enables the researcher to “engage with the 
different intensities that are being offered by persons with disabilities and their 
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environments” (Mercieca & Mercieca, 2010, p. 89). Mercieca‟s analysis situated him in a 
“zone of proximity” (2008, p. 2) to his students, in which he experienced how:   
 
thinking again is possible through the involvement within the lives of students with 
[Profound or Moderate Learning Difficulties], and also how the different spaces of 
intensities provide us with becomings: becoming-teacher and becoming-PMLD, 
and as Deleuze-Guattari would say becoming-imperceptible (Mercieca & Mercieca, 
2010, p. 170). 
 
Mercieca‟s rhizomic analysis took him to a series of planes of sense-making - space, 
body, sound and time - which allowed him to see the disabled students as altering and 
affecting the educational terrain in quite profound ways and which provided, for 
Mercieca, ultimately “a violent experience” (p. 178). The recognition of the violence of 
his own becomings, through the intensities of the students, led him to advocate rhizomic 
analysis and the experience of intensities, leading to an unlearning, as part of teacher 
education. 
 
Olsson‟s (2009) analysis of young children‟s learning is rhizomatic, enabling her to 
portray, often visually, the children‟s assemblages of desire and refusing to inscribe 
these with the formal knowledges of developmental psychology and pedagogy. She 
endorses Mozère‟s (2002) depiction of the act of rhizomic analysis, as not a technique, 
but “a style of philosophy” (p. 124) which enables her to “do research by using and 
experimenting with” the experiences she found in the preschools and the concepts from 
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Deleuze and Guattari. Olsson contends that her analysis differs fundamentally from 
conventional analyses by not “telling practices what they are lacking” (p. 125) and 
instead “focusing on ourselves and the world from another perspective from that of lack” 
(p. 125). Such a positive orientation, enabling the exploration of how desire functions in 
the lives of students with learning disabilities and those with whom they engage, is 
clearly an attractive proposition for learning disability research.  
 
Conclusion: theory and an ethics of research 
Try again. Fail Again. Fail better (Beckett, 1992, p. 101). 
 
The invitation given in this paper to use the theories from the philosophers of difference 
– in the form of concepts and theoretical practices – reflects a plea to address both the 
inequalities produced by an education system that insists that “everyone do better than 
everyone else” (McDermott, 1993, p. 274) and the power of ideology to attribute success 
and failure to children‟s characteristics (Dudley-Marling & Paugh, 2010).  It seeks to 
progress further the work initiated by Sleeter (1987); Carrier (1983) and Tomlinson 
(1988) and taken up by Disability Studies in Education. It delivers none of the “moral 
stakes” (Gallagher, 2010) or “sacrificial ideas” (Sleeter, 1987, p. 552) that was a feature 
of the work of those scholars writing in the 1980s and does not seek to enter into the 
ideological “bickering” (Kavale & Forness, 1995, p. 333) which has characterised the 
debate, within the US, described as occurring between special educators and 
inclusionists.   
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What I aspire to do, by bringing the concepts and practices of the philosophers of 
difference into the arena, is to shift our attention within learning disability away from 
fault, blame and lack and towards something more positive: 
 
Thus the conversation can be turned towards understandings of human difference 
that lead to more productive teaching practices and arrangements, more inclusion, 
and, in the end, a more lucid sense of what we are about as educators and 
researchers (Gallagher, 2010).  
 
The concepts of transgression and the rhizome, just two of the myriad deployable from 
the philosophers of difference, allow us to recognize, in students with learning 
disabilities, resistance and desire and to see them as becoming, with all the potential 
that this entails to grow, change and even succeed. The theoretical practices of 
deconstruction and rhizomic analysis, again only a sample, enable the researcher to 
examine the politics and ideology associated with learning disability and to interpret and 
experiment with the world of learning disability and its inhabitants.  
 
The theory offered by the philosophers of difference enables academics to undertake 
research which is akin to an ethics and  which “might be able to face and face down the 
iniquities of the present” (Critchley 2007, p. 88). Such an ethics, which as Levinas (1969; 
1999) points out, constitutes a reorientation to human subjectivity, has as its core an 
absolute responsibility to the Other. The relationship with the Other is also experienced, 
because of an inadequacy in the face of the Other, as not benign, but as a responsibility 
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that “persecutes me with its sheer weight” (Critchley 2007, p. 59). It is also a vital part of 
what it is to be human: “Let”s face it. We‟re undone by each other. And if not, we‟re 
missing something” (Butler 2004, p. 43).  
Academics choosing to reframe their research along these ethical lines will have to 
accept the inevitability of uncertainty and Biesta‟s (2008) notion of “pedagogy with empty 
hands” (p. 198), although depicting an approach to educating, is an extremely useful 
way of thinking about a research ethics. It requires the academic to approach those in 
the research relationship - teachers, parents, students - without ready solutions or “tricks 
of the trade” (p. 208), derived from research or elsewhere, and to ask “what do you think 
of it?” (p. 208). It demands of the researcher a high level of transparency about both the 
research practices and the researcher‟s position in these. It also requires resisting 
demands for success criteria and, following Samuel Beckett, perhaps offering, as an 
alternative, frameworks for failing effectively. Torrance (2008) advocates that we 
“acknowledge the imperfections of what we do” (p.  523), but these imperfections are 
potentially where new ideas and possibilities for change emerge.  
 
The role of research, if both theory and the implied ethics are taken up, is “to complicate 
rather than explicate” (Taylor 1995, p. 6), allowing academics to “approach” (Biesta 
2008), rather than understand, learning disability and indeed human subjectivity.  It 
demands of the researcher a high degree of reflexivity, humility and a recognition of his 
or her inadequacy in the face of the student with learning disabilities. Lyotard (1988) 
describes this relationship as the differend: “the unstable state and instant of language 
wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be” (p. 13). As 
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Burbules (1997) suggests, encounters with the Other are a kind of mystery and the 
researcher should face these with both intense curiosity and the utmost responsibility. 
 
References 
Allan, J. (1999). Actively seeking inclusion: Pupils with special educational needs in 
mainstream schools. London: Falmer.  
Allan, J. (2003). Inclusion and exclusion in the university. In T. Booth, K. Nes & M. 
Stromstad (Eds.), Developing inclusive teacher education (pp. 130-145). London: 
Routledge.  
Allan, J. (2008). Rethinking inclusive education: The philosophers of difference in 
practice. Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
Allan, J. & I‟Anson, J. (2005). Children‟s rights in school: power, assemblies and 
assemblages. International Journal of Children’s Rights, 12, 123-138. 
Allan, J., I‟Anson, J., Priestley, A. & Fisher, S. (2006). Promising rights: Children’s rights 
in school. Edinburgh: Save the Children.  
Artiles, A. (2004). The end of innocence: Historiography and representation in the 
discursive practice of LD. Journal of Learning Disabilities, 37, 550-555.  
Bains, P. (2002). Subjectless subjectivities. In B. Massumi (Ed.) A shock to thought: 
Expression after Deleuze and Guattari. London/New York: Routledge.  
Baker, B. & Campbell, F. (2006). Transgressing noncrossable borders: Disability, law, 
schooling and nations. In S. Gabel & S. Danforth (Eds.), Vital questions facing 
disability studies in education (pp. 319-346). New York: Peter Lang.  
27 
Ball, S. (1994). Education reform: A critical and post-structural approach. 
Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press 
Beckett, S. (1992). Nowhow on. London: Calder. 
Bell, J. (1993). Doing your own research project: A guide for first time researchers in 
education and social science. Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press.  
Bennett, T. (1990). Outside literature. London: Routledge.  
Biesta, G. (2008). Pedagogy with empty hands: Levinas, education and the question of 
being human. In D. Egéa-Kuehne (Ed.), Levinas and education: At the intersection 
of faith and reason (pp. 198-210). London/New York: Routledge. 
Boyne, R. (1990). Foucault and Derrida: The other side of reason. London: Routledge.  
Burbules, N. (1997). The grammar of difference: Some ways of rethinking difference and 
diversity as educational topics. Australian Educational Researcher, 24, 97-116. 
Butler, J. (2004). Precarious lives. London: Verso. 
Caputo, J. (1997). Deconstruction in a nutshell: A conversation with Jacques Derrida. 
New York: Fordham University Press.  
Carrier, J. G. (1987). Masking the social in educational knowledge: The case of learning 
disability theory. The American Journal of Sociology, 18, 968-974. 
Critchley, S. (1999). The ethics of deconstruction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press.  
Critchley, S. (2007). Infinitely demanding: Ethics of commitment, politics of resistance. 
London/New York: Verso.  
Deleuze, G. (1994). What is philosophy? (H. Tomlison & G. Burchell, Trans.). London: 
Athlone Press.  
28 
Deleuze, G. (1998). Essays critical and clinical. (D. Smith & M. Greco, Trans.). New 
York: Routledge.  
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1987). A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. 
London: The Athlone Press.  
Deleuze, G. & Parnet, C. (1987). Dialogues. (H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam, Trans.). 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology (G. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press.   
Derrida, J. (1982). Margins of philosophy. (A. Bass, Trans.). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Derrida, J. (1988). Limited Inc. (S. Weber, Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press.  
Derrida, J. (1992). Force of law: The mystical foundation of authority. In D. Cornell, M. 
Rosenfield & D. Carlson (Eds.), Deconstruction and the possibility of justice. (M. 
Quaintance, Trans.). (pp. 3-67). New York/London: Routledge.  
Dudley-Marling, C. (2004). The social construction of learning disabilities. Journal of 
learning disabilities, 37, 482-489. 
Dudley-Marling, C. & Paugh, P. Confronting the discourse of deficiencies. Disability 
Studies Quarterly, 30. Retrieved from http://www.dsq-
sds.org/article/view/1241/1285 
Eagleton, T. (1993). Literary theory: An introduction. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.  
29 
Ferri, B. & Connor, D. (2009). “I was the special ed girl:” (En)gendering disability from 
the standpoint of urban working class young women of color. Journal of Gender 
and Education, 22, 105-121.  
Foucault, M. (1994). “A Preface to Transgression”.  In Michael Foucault. Aesthetics: 
Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 2 (pp. 69-88). London: Penguin.  
Gallagher, D. (20010). Hiding in plain sight: The nature and role of theory in learning 
disability labelling. Disability Studies Quarterly, 30. Retrieved from http://www.dsq-
sds.org/article/view/1231/1278 
Goodley, D. & Moore, M. (2002). Arts against disability: The performing arts of people 
with learning disabilities. Plymouth, MA: BILD. 
Granger, D. (2010). A tribute to my dyslexic body, as I travel in the form of a ghost. 
Disability Studies Quarterly, 30. http://www.dsq-sds.org/article/view/1236/1281 
Gregoriou, Z. (2004). Commencing the rhizome: Towards a minor philosophy of 
education. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 36, 233-251. 
Hickey-Moody, A. (2008). Deleuze, Guattari, and the boundaries of intellectual disability. 
In S. Gabel & S. Danforth (Eds.), Disability & the politics of education  (pp. 353-
370). New York: Peter Lang.  
Kavale, K. & Forness, S. R. (1998). The politics of learning disabilities. Learning 
Disability Quarterly, 21, 245-273. 
Lather, P. (2006). (Post)feminist methodology: Getting lost OR a scientificity we can 
bear to learn from. Paper presented at the research methods festival, Oxford, July. 
Retrieved October 22, 2006, from 
ttp://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/festival/programme/cfe/documents/lather.pdf 
30 
Levinas, I. (1969). Totality and infinity. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.  
Levinas, I. (1999). Alterity and transcendence. Columbia University Press: New York. 
Lyotard, J. (1988). The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (G. Van Den Abbeele, Trans.). 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Lyotard,  J. (1993). The postmodern explained. Minneapolis/London: University of 
Minnesota Press.  
McDermott, R. P. (1993). The acquisition of a child by a learning disability. In C. Chaiklin 
& J. Lave (Eds.), Understanding practice: Perspectives on activity and context (pp. 
269-305). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
McDermott, R. & Varenne, H. (1995). Culture as disability. Anthropology and Education 
Quarterly, 26, 323-348.  
Maclure, M. (2005a). Deconstruction as a method of research. In B. Somekh & C. Lewin 
(Eds.) Research methods in the social sciences. London: Sage.  
Maclure, M. (2005b). Entertaining doubts: On frivolity as resistance. Keynote 
presentation to the Discourse, Power, Resistance Conference. Plymouth, March. 
Mercieca, D. (2008). Living otherwise: Students with profound and multiple learning 
disabilities as agents in educational contexts. Unpublished PhD Thesis. University 
of Stirling. 
Mercieca, D. & Mercieca, D. (2010). Opening research to intensities: Rethinking 
disability research with Deleuze and Guattari. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
44, 79-92. 
Mozère, L (2006) What‟s the trouble with identity? Practices and theories from France. 
Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood, 7, 109-118.  
31 
Olsson, L. (2009). Movement and experimentation in young children‟s learning: Deleuze 
and Guattari in early childhood education. London/New York: Routledge.  
Patton, P. (2000). Deleuze and the political. London: Routledge.  
Patton, P. (2003). Future politics. In P. Patton & J. Protevi (Eds.) Between Deleuze and 
Derrida. London: Continuum.  
Phillips, E. & Pugh, D (1987). How to get a PhD. Milton Keynes/Philadelphia: Open 
University Press. 
Rajchman, J. (2001). The Deleuze connections. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Rancière, J. (2008). Jacques Rancière and indisciplinarity. An interview. Art and 
Research, 2, 1-10. 
Reid, D. K. & Valle, J. (2004). The discursive practice of learning disability: Implications 
for instruction and parent-school relations. Journal of Learning Disabilities, 37, 
466-481. 
Roy, K. (2003). Teachers in nomadic spaces: Deleuze and curriculum. New York: Peter 
Lang.  
Shostak, J (2002). Understanding, designing and conducting qualitative research in 
education. Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open University Press.  
Sleeter, C. (1987). Why is there learning disabilities? A critical analysis of the birth of the 
field in its social context. In T. Popkewitz (Ed.), The formation of school subjects: 
The struggle for creating an American institution. (pp. 210-237). London: Falmer 
Press.  
Taylor, M. (1995) Rhizomatic folds of interstanding. Tekhnema 2: Technics and Finitude. 
Spring. Retrieved June 27, 2003, from http://tekhnema.free.fr/2Taylorhtm. 
32 
Tomlinson, S. (1988). Why Johnny can‟t read: Critical theory and special education. 
European Journal of Special Needs Education, 3, 45-58. 
Torrance, H. (2008). Building confidence in qualitative research: Engaging the demands 
of policy. Qualitative Inquiry, 14, 507-527. 
Tremain, S. (2005). (Ed.), Foucault and the government of disability. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.  
